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JAMES PARKS BRADLEY, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 
FRANCISCO, Respondent; FRANCES (BRADLEY) 
LANE, Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Property Settlement Agreementa-Inter-
pretation.-The rule that in the absence of conflicting extrinsic 
evidence as to the meaning of a property settlement agreement 
the trial court's interpretation is not binding on the Supreme 
Court does not apply where conflicting extrinsic evidence 
was presented; under such circumstances, if there is evidence 
which supports the trial court's interpretation, including in-
ferences which it could reasonably draw, the court on appeal 
will adhere to the interpretation placed by the trial court on 
the writings and conduct of the parties. 
[2] Appeal-Questions of Law a.nd Fa.ct-Documentary Evidence. 
-Conflicting evidence will not be weighed by an appellate 
eourt merely because it was presented by affidavit rather 
than orally. 
[8] Husband and Wife - Property Settlement Agreements-In-
terpretation.-The trial court's interpretation of a property 
settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree, based 
on its finding as to the intent of the parties, may be sufficiently 
supported by affidavits of the former wife and of the attorney 
who drafted the agreement, by the language of the agreement, 
and by the former husband's own conduct. 
[4] ld.-Property Settlement Agreements-Interpretation.-Where 
a property settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce de-
cree obligated the former husband to pay his former wife 40 
per cent of his net income commencing on a certain date, he 
could not successfully argue that since his remarriage his 
present wife's community (one-half) interest in his earnings 
must be deducted before computation of the 40 per cent pay-
able to his former wife in view of the trial court's determina-
tion that such a deduction was .contrary to the intentions of 
the parties at the time they executed their contract. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife, § 63; Am.Jur., Husband 
and Wife, § 318 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4] Husband and Wife, § 157(6) ; 
[2} Appeal and Error, §1288; [5) Assilzoments. §20; [6,11, 
17-19) Divorce, § 266; [7, 8J Divorc(', §~ 203, 216: [9) Constitu-
tional Law, § 134; Husbimd and \vife, ~ 157; flO, 12] Divorce, 
§ 260; [13] Divorc!', ~ 203; [14] Divorce, §§ 203,239; [15] Divorce, 
§§ 249, 266; [16] Divorce, §§ 198, 260. 
810 BRADLEY tI. SUPERIOR COUB'l' [48 C.2d 
[6] Assignments-Oontractual Interests-Salary and Wages.-A 
property aettlement agreement incorporated in a divorce de. 
eree obligating the former husband to pay his former wife 
40 per cent of his net incoTlle from a certain date does not 
constitute an assignment of wages or salary within Lab. Code, 
§ aoo, limiting such assignments. 
[6] Divorce-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceeding&-
Punishment.-To imprison a former husband for failure to 
make payments to his former wife under a property settlement 
agreement obligating him to pay her 40 per cent of his net 
income from a certain date would violate Const., art. I, § 15, 
forbidding imprisonment for debt, where it had been specifi-
cally and finally determined, in an action between the parties, 
that the payments involved were not "a severable provision for 
alimony" and the agreement itself declared that it was "m-
tended • •• to refer only to property rights. . . ." 
[7] Id.-Permanent Alimony-E:tfect of Agreement of Parties: 
Modi1i.cation of Allowance.-A divorce decree is subject to 
modification if the payments therein prescribed are for ali-
mony, maintenance or support, though based on a property 
settlement agreement, but not if such payments in themselves 
are an integral part of an adjustment of property rights. 
[8] Id.-Permanent AlimonY-E:tfect of Agreement of Parties: 
Modi1i.cation of Allowance.-To the extent that monthly pay-
ments from a divorced husband to his former wife represent 
a division of the community property itself, or constitute an 
inseparable part of the consideration for a property settle-
ment, they are not alimony and accordingly cannot be modi-
fied without changing the terms of the property settlement 
agreement. 
[9] Constitutional Law-Obligation of Contracts: Husband and 
Wife-Property Settlement Agreements.-Neither the court 
nor the Legislature may impair the obligation of a valid con-
tract (Const., art. I, §§ 1, 16), and a court cannot lawfully 
disregard the provisions of property settlement agreements or 
deny to either party his rights thereunder. 
[10] Divorce-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceedings.-
Although every doubt should be resolved in favor of the liberty 
of a citizen in the enforcement of the constitutional provision 
tllat no person shall be imprisoned for debt, a court may never-
theless punish by imprisonment as a contempt the willful act 
of- a spouse (or former spouse) who, having the ability and 
opportunity to comply, deliberately refuses to obey a valid 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Assignments, § 23 et seq.; Am.Jur., Assign-
ments, § 41 et seq. 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 11; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 54, Constitu-
tional Law, § 327. ,,' 
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order to pay alimony or an allowance for the BtIpport of the 
other spouse (or former other spouse). 
[11] ld.-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceedings-Pun-
ishment.-The obligation to make payments of alimony or for 
support of the other spouse (or forriler other spouse) is not 
• "debt" within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty 
against imprisonment for debt. 
[12] ld. - Enforcement of Awards - Contempt Proceedings.-
Where the payments provided in a property settlement agree-
ment constitute an adjustment of property interests rather 
than alimony, support or maintenance, the more generally 
prevailing rule is that decrees based thereon are not enforce-
able by contempt proceedings. 
[18] ld.-Permanent Alimony-E:trect of Agreement of Parties.-
There may be situations in which the fact that a party has 
agreed to pay some fixed or ascertainable amount as alimony 
does not change or cODtrol the character of the obligation 
sought to be enforced by the other; merely adding the con-
sensual element of agreement to pay support does not oblit-
erate an existing legal duty. 
[14] ld.-Permanent Alimony-E:trect of Agreement.-In the ab-
sence of a waiver by the contracting spouses (expressly or by 
necessary implication) of reciprocal rights to support other 
than as provided in an agreement, either party may properly 
seek to enforce in a divorce proceeding t.he obligations imposed 
by law as incidents of the marriage; but where the parties 
bargain with each other and agree that the terms of their con-
tract shall thereupon and thenceforth grant, delimit and ex-
clusively define their respective rights and obligations inter se, 
then it is to the contract alone Ifnd to conventional civil pro-
ceedings for the enforcement of contract rights that they 
must look for a remedy in the event of breach. 
[15] ld.-Enforcement of Awards-Execution.-Inclusion in a 
divorce jUdgment of a contract d('fining the respective rights 
and obligations of the parties and excluding the concept of 
alimony, support or maintenance may furnish a basis for 
subsequent proceedings leading to issuance of a writ of execu-
tion, but cannot support a commitm(>nt ·to imprisonment for 
failure to pay the judgment debt. 
[16] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Object.-The term "alimony" does 
not contemplate a settle111('nt of property interests or general 
endowment of wealth; it has for its 801(' object the provision 
of food, clothing, habitation and other n('c('ssaries for sup-
port, and it is to attain that ohject that the law imposes an 
obligation which is regarded os something- oth('r than a debt 
and which may be enforced by contempt proceedings UpOl, 
appropriate showi,ng: 
) 
) 
) 
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[17] ld. - Enforcement of Awards - Oontempt Proceedinp -
Punishment.-Payments provided in a property settlement 
agreement which are found to constitute an adjustment of 
property interests rather than a severable provision for ali-
mony should be held to fan within the constitutional pro-
scription against imprisonment for debt; that is, if the obliga-
tion sought to be enforced is contractual and negotiated, as 
distinguished from marital and imposed by law, even though 
the contract relates to marriage obligations, the remedy must 
be appropriate to the right asserted. 
[18] ld.-Enforcement of Awa.rds-Oontempt ProceediDg&-Pnn-
ishment.-Payments which fan into the category of law-im-
posed alimony or separate maintenance are based on the 
statutory obligation of marital support, may be modified by 
the court on a proper showing, ordinarily terminate with the 
death of either party, and may properly be held not to con-
stitute a "debt" within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
vision against imprisonment for debt; but no such case for 
special exemption from the constitutional proscription can 
be made where the payments represent the result of a bargain 
negotiated by the parties in adjustment of their respective 
interests. (Disapproving any implication to the contrary in 
In re Rasmussen. 56 Cal.App. 368 [205 P. 72]; Ex Parte Weiler, 
106 Cal.App. 485 [289 P. 645]; In re Lazar, 37 Cal.App.2d 
327 [99 P.2d 342]; Seymour v. Seymour, IS Cal.App.2d 481 
[64 P.2d 168]; Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.App. 64 [214 
P. 252]; Shogren v. Superior Court, 93 Cal.App.2d 356, 364 
[209 P.2d 108].) 
[19] ld.-Enforcement of AWa.rds-Oontempt Proceedings-Pun-
ishment.-Where it has been finally determined that payments 
to be made by a former husband to his former wife constitute 
an inseverable part of an integrated adjustment of all prop-
erty relations of the parties and not a severable provision 
for alimony, the enforeement of such payments by contempt 
proceedings is forbidden by the constitutional prohibition 
against imprisonment for debt. 
PROCEEDING in certiorari to review an order of the 
Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco ad-
jUdging petitioner to be in contempt. Order annulled. 
Sullivan, Roche, Johnson & Farraher and James Farraher 
for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Aaron N. CoheJ?. Sidney .Rudy and Ted Finman for Real 
Party in Interest. 
) 
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SCHAUER, J.-A writ of certiorari was issued for the 
purpose of reviewing an order of the superior court adjudg-
ing petitioner to be in contempt for refusing to make certain 
payments to his former wife in accordance with the provisions 
of their property settlement agreement and decree of divorce, 
and directing that petitioner be imprisoned if he fails to com-
ply with the court's order of payment. We have concluded 
that although upon the record before us certain of petitioner's 
f .. ontentions concerning interpretation of the provisions of the 
property settlement agreement cannot be npheld, the order 
directing his imprisonment for contempt upon his continued 
failure to make payment should nevertheless be annulled as 
ill violation of the constitutional prohibition against imprison-
ment for debt. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) 
In May, 1946, petitioner and his then wife, Frances, entered 
into a property settlement agreement in which it is declared 
that the parties owned both community and separate property, 
and that they desired to agree to a separation and to settle 
and determine their respective property rights and to provide 
for the care and custody of their two minor children. The 
agreement further declares that it "is intended as a Property 
Settlement Agreement and to refer only to property rights. 
" (Italics added.) The wife then instituted divorce 
proceedings in the state of Nevada and in June, 1946, was 
awarded a default divorce decree. Such decree by its terms 
purports to order, among other things, that the written prop-
erty settlement agreement between the parties dated May 14, 
1946, is "hereby approved, ratified, confirmed and adopted 
by the Court, and by reference made a part of this judgment 
and decree . • . and each of the parties is hereby ordered to 
carry out . . . each and all of the provisions by him or her 
respectively required under the terms of said agreement ..• " 
In September, 1952, the Nevada decree was established in 
California as a decree of respondent superior court and such 
California decree declares that" the parties are hereby ordered 
to perform each and every obligation provided for by" the 
Nevada decree. The California decree was affirmed on appeal 
and became final in June, 1954. (See Lane v. Bradley (1954), 
124 Cal.App.2d 661 [268 P.2d 1092].) 
Under the property settlement agreement petitioner agreed, 
among other things, to transfer certain real and personal 
property to the wife, Frances, and to place in escrow as 
security for performan5J-C of his obligations under the agree-
.CM-If 
) 
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ment certificates evidencing 40,000 shares of stock of Bradley 
Mining Company, which stock is the property of petitioner; 
under certain circumstances the stock could be sold with the 
proceeds going to Frances. Petitioner further agreed to pay 
to Frances "forty per cent. (40%) of his net income, com-
mencing January 1st, 1947, exclusive of capital gains and 
losses and distributions out of capital, but before deduction 
of income taxes or charitable contributions, less one per cent. 
(1%) of such net income for each 1,000 shares of said 40,000 
shares of capital stock of Bradley Mining Company placed 
in escrow which have been sold with the consent of First 
Party [Frances] pursuant to ... this contract." 
Following the Nevada divorce, petitioner remarried in 
March, 1948, and Frances remarried in October, 1948. For 
four and one-half months after his remarriage petitioner com-
puted his payments to Frances on the theory that half his 
income belonged to his new wife as community property and 
that therefore he was obligated to pay to Frances 40 per 
cent of only his one-half of such community income. Peti-
tioner was then advised by the attorney wko kad represented 
botk parties in preparing tke property settlement agreement 
that his apportionment theory was erroneous in that his 
remarriage did not affect the computation of the amounts 
accruing under his obligations to Frances. Thereafter, from 
August, 1948, until he secured independent counsel in March, 
1950, petitioner computed his payments to Frances without 
any adjustment based on his remarriage. Then such inde- , 
pendent counsel advised petitioner that in his opinion peti- . 
tioner was obligated to pay to Frances only 40 per cent of . 
one-half of the community income of petitioner and his new 
wife, and, further, that the words "net income" as used 
in the property settlement agreement meant net income as 
computed for income tax purposes (that is, gross income less 
certain deductions not theretofore taken by petitioner in 
computing his payments to Frances). Relying upon such 
advice petitioner paid Frances only $1,800 during the year 
1950. (The factual data used for computing such amount are 
not shown in the present record.) 
Thereafter, in April, 1951, petitioner consulted different 
independent counsel and was advised that the remarriage of 
Frances terminated petitioner's obligations to pay to her 40 
per cent of his net income and that he had already overpaid 
her under the terms of the property settlement agreement. 
Petitioner therellpon ceased all such payments, and in June, 
) 
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1951, Frances commenced the action l by which the Nevada 
divorce decree was established as a decree of the California 
superior court. Petitioner defended the action on the ground 
that the provision for payment to Frances of 40 per cent of 
his net income was an alimony provision and therefore was 
terminated by the remarriage of Frances. The trial court 
made its findings and conclusions to the effect that petitioner's 
obligation to make payments to Frances was a continuing one 
which "has not terminated or been diminished by reason of 
the remarriage of plaintiff [Frances] or for any other reason. " 
Judgment was entered awarding Frances recovery of the sums 
accrued to that date on the theory indicated in the above 
mentioned findings and conclusions, and establishing the 
Nevada decree in this state. As hereinabove mentioned, the 
judgment, which became final in June, 1954, also ordered the 
parties "to perform each and every obligation provided for 
by" the Nevada decree. 
In February, 1955, Frances instituted the present contempt 
proceeding, asserting that since June 16, 1951, petitioner has 
wilfully failed and refused to pay to her 40 per cent of his 
net income, except for a payment of $15,000 on account, and 
that as of February, 1955, he owed her an additional 
$37,969.30. Petitioner defended on the ground that the term 
"net income" should be construed 80 as to permit him to 
make various deductions and that one-half his salary (i.e., 
one-half of the community income of himself and his present 
wife) should be excluded on the theory that it was not his 
income but belonged to such wife. 
The evidence which was presented to the trial court con-
sisted in part of the judgment roll in the California action. 
In addition testimony was submitted in the form of affidavits. 
The court found that in using the term "net income" the 
parties had not intended that petitioner be allowed any of 
the deductions for which he contended or that a half of the 
community income be excluded in Case he remarried. Judg-
ment was rendered accordingly, and petitioner was held in 
contempt and ordered imprisoned unless he made installment 
payments to Frances pursuant to a schedule set forth in 
the order of contempt and commitment. This petition for 
review followed. 
[1] Petitioner, contending that the trial court erred in 
its finding as to the meaning of the term "net income," cites 
'Hereinafter tor brenty referred to as the Ca.li!ornia aetioa. 
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(Messenger v. M('ss('nger (1956), 46 Ca1.2d 619, 626 [4] 
[297 P.2d 988) and quotes the rule that "In the absence of i 
(·onflicting extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the agree-
ment, the trial court '8 interpretation of it is not binding on 
this court." But where, as here, conflicting extrinsic evi-
dence was prrsented, the quoted rule does not apply. On 
the contrary, under such circumstances if there is evidence 
which supports the trial court's interpretation, including in-
ferellces which it could reasonably draw, the court on appeal 
will adhere to the interpretation placed by the trial court on 
the writings and conduct of the parties. (Quader-Kino A_ O. 
v. Nebcnzal (1950), 35 Ca1.2d 287, 294 [1] [217 P.2d 650]. 
and cases cited therein; Abbott v. Hauschild (1952), 113 Cal. 
App.2d 383, 387 [2] f248 P.2d 41].) [2] Petitioner's sug-
gestion. that because in the present case the evidence was pre-
sented by affidavit rather than orally it will be weighed by 
an appellate court, is without merit. (See Riley v. Turpin 
(1956),47 Ca1.2d 152, 157 [6] [301 P.2d 834].) 
[3] Following the rule stated, it appears that the evidence 
supports the trial court's int.erpretation of the agreement here 
involved, based upon its finding as to the intent of the parties. 
Such supporting evidence consists of affidavits of Frances 
and of the attorney who drafted the agreement,. the language 
of the agreement itself, and petitioner's own conduct. Inas-
much as petitioner argues the weight of the evidence rather 
than seriously urging that there is no evidence whatsoever 
supporting the trial court's construction of the agreement, no 
useful purpose would be served by here relating the evidence 
in detaiJ.% [4] Petitioner's argument that since his remarriage 
his present wife's community (one-half) interest in his earn-
ings must be deducted before computation of the 40 per cent 
payable to Frances, likewise is without merit in view of the 
trial court's determination that such a deduction was con-
trary to the intentions of petitioner and Frances at the time 
they executed their contract. [5] Further, such a contract 
settling property rights does not constitute an assignment of 
"The following portions of the oral opinion rendered by Judge Sweigert 
ably summarize much of the evidence which supports his (the trial 
court's) decision: "[T]here is no better place to look for enlightenment 
than to the conduct of the parties themselves ... [T]he admissions and 
the attitude of the defendant hushand in litigation and his acquieseenc.p 
for a long period following the executions of the agreement furnish power-
ful rebuttal of his pres~nt claims. According to the evidence in thp 
present case, the defendant IlUsband from the date of the agreement, 
May 14th. 1946, to at least March 16th, 1948, the date of his own 
remarriage, a period of nearly two years, computed hie Bet income 
) 
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wagps Of salary within th(, provisions of s('etinn 300 of the 
Labof Codl" limiting sUC'h assignmC'nt. 
and performed the agreement without ever asserting any of the deduction 
rights which he now claims ... Now after his remarriage, March 16th, 
1 !J4S, the ilefendant did eXIloress the opinion that his new wife's commu 
nity share of his salary should he excluded and he acted on that view 
for several months until addsed to the contrary by ... the attorney 
who had represented both parties in the drafting of the agreement ... 
Ho far as appears no other deduction rights of any kind were ever 
asserted or even mcntiollcd until March, 1950, when the defendant con· 
~lItted another counsel . . . who confirmed his view regarding the 
deduction of the community interest of his wife and who also raised 
the point, apparently for the first time, that the defe.ndant was further 
entitled to take all ineomp tax deductions .... Thereupon the defendant 
ceased paympnts on the theory that he already had overpaid the plaintiff. 
"It should be noted, however, that the defendant husband himself con· 
cedes that his first belief that he could exclude all income tax deduction~ 
was in March, 1950. That appears in defendant's affidavit ... 
"In April, 1951, the defendant husband consulted other lind addi· 
tional counsel who then advised him that all of his obligations under 
the eontract had been terminated by the plaintiff's remarriage of 
October 21st, 1948. What advice if any was received by him in April. 
1951, regarding possible deductions under the contract does not appear. 
At any rate, when the action to establish and enforce the Ne"ada decree 
was commenced in June, 1951, the complaint alleged that between 
January 1st, 1950, and June 15th, 1951, the defendant's net income had 
been a given amount. thirty·three thousand some odd dollars. This 
allegation was admitted by the defendant in his answer, although the fact 
of the matter was that that amount was, in fact, a computation without 
regard to any of the deductions now claimed by the defendant. . .. 
The sole point raised by the defendant in the Buit was not formula for 
net income but the effect of the plaintiff's remaniage upon the contract 
obligations of the defendant. 
"It is rather difficult for a court to see how a man of considerable 
wealth, accustomed to keeping accounts, conscious of tax and other 
factors, and ha"ing available at all times the ad"ice of accountants and 
counsel of his own choosing, would continue to payout under a contract 
substantial amounts over and above that which he himself contemplated 
and intended when the contract was made. In these circumstances such 
alleged overpayments are not explainable b~' inad"ertence or ignorance; 
the only reasonable conclusion is that the defendant husband paid out 
exactly what he beJieved and originally intended to be his obligations 
under the terms of the contract until he was ad"ised long after the 
contract was made that it could be interpreted to mean something 
different than his own original intent. But in this situation we go even 
further than that. It appears here that after the defendant husband 
received express advice concerning a possible interpretation of the con· 
tract, even then in a formal lawsuit pending in which his obligations 
under the contract were involved, [he] makes a formal admission of 
fact which is counter to the interpretation of the contract which he now 
claims. For these reasons ... I have come to the conclusion that even 
assuming this contract to be susceptible of the interpretation placed on it 
by the plaintiff wife and also susceptible of the interpretation placed 
upon it by the defendant husband, and even aSBuming that the contract 
is ambiguous in that respect, that the evidence of the conduct and per· 
formance of the defendant husband is such that any doubt concerning 
the meaning of the contract according to its terms must be resolved in 
accordance with the kind of performance which the defendant rendered 
) 
) 
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[6] Petitioner furthpr contends that to imprison him for 
failure to makp payments to Frances under the property 
settlement agreement here involved would violate the pro-
visions of the state Constitution forbidding imprisonment for 
debt. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)8 This contention is sound. 
In the California action it was specifically and finally deter-
mined, as between the parties, that the payments here involved 
are •• an inseverable part of an integrated adjustment of all 
property relations of the parties and not . . . a severable pro-
vision for alimony," and that therefore section 139 of the 
Civil Code did not apply so as to terminate, upon the remar-
riage of Frances, petitioner's obligation to make such pay-
ments. (Lane v. Bradley (1954), supra, 124 Cal.App.2d 661, 
666-667.) And as already mentioned herein, the property 
settlement agreement itself declares that it "is intended ... 
to refer only to property rights. . . ." [7] It is, of course, ' 
also the rule that a decree is subject to modification if the 
payments therein provided are for alimony, maintenance or 
support, even though based on a property settlement agree-
ment, but not if, as already determined in this case, they in 
themselves are an integral part of an adjustment of property 
rights. (CodornU v. Codorniz (1950), 34 Ca1.2d 811, 814 
[215 P.2d 32] ; Hough v. Hough (1945),26 Ca1.2d605, 612-615 
[160 P.2d 15J.) [8] Or, as declared in Dexter v. Dexter 
(1954), 42 Ca1.2d 36, 41-42 [265 P.2d 873], "to the extent 
that they [monthly payments] represent a division of the 
under it for a considerable period rather than in accordance with his 
presently-asserted interpretation of the contract. 
UN ow for these reasons I will make a ruling ... that the Nevada de-
cree of June 24th, 1946, as established herein September 26th, 1952. 
and the property agreement of May 14th, 1946, approved and made a 
part of the decrees, must be interpreted to express an intention of the 
parties that the defendant was to pay 40 per cent of his net income .•• , 
exclnsive of capital gains and losses and distributions out of capital, but 
before [the various deductions presently claimed by defendant] ... 
" ••. I have separately considered the question whether or not the 
defendant's claim that the half-community interest of his present wife in 
his salary should be deductihle under this contract. but I have come to 
the conclusion that ... it wuld not be deducted under any ... theory 
of interpretation of the agreement. It seems to me that agreement waa 
negotiated in contemplation of the defendant husband's income at the 
time of the separation of the parties. It would be unreasonable to 
aSlUlI!e that the parties had in mind but did not mention a non-existent 
but possible future event which would suddenly and substantially alter 
the factors of the defendant's income . • ." 
"·See. 15. No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil aetion, 
.. mesne or final proce88; 'unless in eases of fraud, nor in civil actionll 
for torts, except in eases of wilful injury to person or property; and DO 
penon Ihall be imprisoned tor a militia fine in time of peace." 
) 
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community property itself, or constitute an inseparable part 
of the consideration for the property settlement, they are not 
alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified without changing 
the terms of the property settlement agreement of the parties. " 
[9] Neither the court nor the Legislature may impair thc 
• obligation of a valid contract (Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 16) 
and a court cannot lawfully disregard the provisions of such 
contracts or deny to either party his rights thereunder. 
(Majors v. Majors (1945), 70 Cal.App.2d 619,627 [10] [161 
P.2d 494] ; see also McClure v. McClure (1893), 100 Cal. 339, 
343 [34 P. 822] ; Hensley v. Hensley (1918), 179 Cal. 284, 
287-288 [183 P. 445] ; M7~ller v. Superior Court (1937),9 Cal. 
2d 733, 737 [4] [72 P.2d 868] ; Hill v. Ht1l (1943),23 Cal.2d 
82,90 [142 P.2d 417] ; Adams v. Adams (1947),29 Ca1.2d 621, 
624 [1] [177 P.2d 265] ; Patton v. Patton (1948), 32 Cal.2d 
520, 524 [196 P .2d 909].) 
[10] Although," As in the case of all constitutional pro-
visions designed to safeguard the liberties of the person, 
every doubt should be resolved in favor of the liberty of the 
citizen in the enforcement of the constitutional provision that 
no person shall be imprisoned for debt" (11 Am.Jur. 1128, 
§ 327; see also id., 670, § 59; 16 C.J.S. 1004, § 204(1)), a court 
may nevertheless punish by imprisonment as a contempt the 
willful act of a spouse (or former spouse) who, having the 
ability and opportunity to comply. deliberately refuses to 
obey a valid order to pay alimony or an allowance for the 
support of the other spouse (or former other spouse). [11] It 
is held that the obligation to make such payments is not a 
"debt" within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty 
against imprisonment for debt. (M17ler v. Superior Court 
(1937), supra, 9 Cal.2d 733, 737 [3]; Ex parte Spencer 
(1890), 83 Cal. 460, 465 [23 P. 395, 17 Am.St.Rep 266] ; see 
also 11 Am.Jur., 1129-1130.) 
[12] Where, however, the payments provided in a prop-
erty settlement agreement constitute an adjustment of prop-
erty interests, rather than alimony, support, or maintenance, 
the more generally prevailing rule is stated to be that decrees 
based thereon are not enforceable by contempt proceedings. 
(154 A.L.R. 466, 468-469.) The rule in Washington is "that 
the provisions of such [divorce] decrees, as they relate to the 
payment of money (as distinguished from alimony or sup-
port money for children), cannot be enforced by contempt 
proceedings. [Cit8;tions of Washington cases.] As pointed 
out in Corrigeux'v. Corrigeux [1950, 37 Wn.2d 403], 224 
) 
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P.2d 343, back of these cases is the constitutional prOVISIon 
that there can be no imprisonment for debt (state constitu-
tion, Art. I, sec. 17), together with holdings by this court 
and courts generally that alimony and support money for 
children is not a debt within the purview of such constitu-
tional provisions." (Robinson v. Robinson (1950), 37 Wn. 
2d 511, 515 [225 P.2d 411,413].) In Maryland it has been held 
that only modifiable alimony payments may be enforced by 
contempt, and that both child support and unmodifiable pay-
ments based on the parties' written agreement (even though 
such payments might be characterized as "alimony" in the 
court's order in the divorce proceedings) fall within the eon-
stitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for debt. 
(Bushman v. Bushman (1929), 157 Md. 166 (145 A. 488, 
491-492] j Dickey v. Dickey (1928), 154 Md. 675 (141 A. 387, 
390, 58 A.L.R. 634].) Further, it appears that in Michigan 
"The fact that the court's award, made pursuant to or in ac-
cordance with the parties' agreement, includes both alimony 
and a property settlement (or a settlement in lieu of dower, 
or other obligation not enforceable by contempt proceedings) 
commingled in such a way that it does not appear, from the 
provisions of the decree, what amount of the award is alimony 
and what amount property settlement (or other obligation), 
has been deemed to preclude the enforcement of such award 
by contempt proceedings." (154 A.L.R. 475.) . 
No California case has been cited or discovered in which 
the point has been squarely presented and passed on. In 
M17ler v. Superior Court (1937), supra, 9 Ca1.2d 733, 737, 
enforcement by contempt was allowed of the provisions of a 
property settlement agreement providing for the payment of 
$75 a month. However, the court there pointed out (p. 739 
of 9 Cal.2d) that "The basis of the obligation in the case of 
an approval (of a property settlement agreement] and order 
to pay, as in the case of an award of allowance not based on 
agreement, is the statutory obligation of marital support 
which is not a 'debt' within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision. We are of the view that the orclrr to nay a monthly 
(lUou-oncl', eYen though in accordance with: be n~"eement of the 
parties, is not a 'debt' within the meanil1" Gi the constitu-
tional prohibition." (Italics added.) [13]· l'hat is to say, 
there may be situations in which the fact that a party has 
agreed to pay some fixed or ascertainable amount af; alimony 
does not change or .control the character of the obligation 
sought to be enforcl!d by the other. Merely adding the con-
) 
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sensual element of agreement to pay support does not oblit-
erate an existing legal duty. [14] In the absence of a waiver 
by the contracting spouses (expressly or by necessary implica-
tion) of reciprocal rights to support other than as provided 
in the agreement, either party may properly seek to enforce 
in the divorce proceeding the obligations imposed by law as 
incidents of the marriage. But where the parties bar-
gain with each other and agree that the terms of their con-
tract shall thereupon and thenceforth grant, delimit and ex-
clusively define their respective rights and obligations inter Be, 
then it is to the contract alone, and to conventional civil pro-
ceedings for the enforcement of contract rights, that they 
must look for a remedy in the event of breach. [15] Inclu-
sion of such a contract in a judgment of divorce may furnish 
a basis for subsequent proceedings leading to issuance of a 
writ of execution but cannot support a commitment to im-
prisonment for failure to pay the judgment debt. 
In In re Lazar (1940), 37 Cal.App.2d 327 [99 P.2d 342]. 
the theory that the payments ordered were analogous to sup-
port money was in part relied upon to support enforcement by 
contempt of a property settlement agreement carried into the 
divorce decree. It may be also noted that that case, citing 
Miller v. Superior Court, supra, asserts (p. 331 of 37 Cal. 
App.2d) that compliance with an order "directing the settle-
ment of separate property rights, may be enforced by im-
prisonment," whereas, as already pointed out, the decision 
in the Miller case actually rested upon the theory of marital 
support. Further, the payments provided by the property 
settlement agreement involved in In re Lazar were, some nine 
months later, stated by this (Supreme) court to be for ali-
mony, support and maintenance of the wife, rather than as an 
adjustment of property rights. (Lazar v. Superior Court 
(1940), 16 Cal.2d 617, 621-622 [5] (107 P.2d 249].) The 
case of Tripp v. Superior Court (1923), 61 Ca1.App. 64, 67 
[214 P. 252], also relied upon in In re Lazar, likewise appears 
to turn in part upon the husband '$ obligation to make "proper 
provision for the support and maintenance of the wife, pro-
vided that it were first ascertained that petitioner was guilty 
of the charges made against him in the divorce action." 
Moreover, no mention of the constitutional provision is made 
in thE' Tripp case, and the holding that the property settle-
ment agreement and divorce decree there involved were en-
forceable by contempt proceedings was reached without cita-
tion of authority; in support thereof. 
) 
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[16] It is to be recognized that the term "alimony" does 
not contemplate a settlement of property interests or general 
endowment of wealth. "Like the alimentum of the civil law, 
from which the word was evidently derived, it has for its sole I 
object the provision of food, clothing, habitation, and other 
necessaries for ... support." (17 Am.Jur. 406, and eases 
cited, note 12.) It is to attain that "sole object" that the 
law imposes an obligation which is regarded as something 
other than a debt and which may be enforced by contempt 
proceedings upon appropriate showing. Here the judgment 
manifestly purports to sanction a negotiated agreement rather 
than an obligation imposed by law. 
[17] We are satisfied that the better view is that payments 
provided in a property settlement agreement which are found 
to constitute an adjustment of property interests, rather than 
a severable provision for alimony, should be held to fall 
within the constitutional proscription against imprisonment 
for debt. That is, if the obligation sought to be enforced is 
contractual and negotiated, as distinguished from marital 
and imposed by law, even though the contract relates to mar-
riage obligations, the remedy must be appropriate to the 
right asserted. [18] Payments which fan into the category 
of law-imposed alimony or separate maintenance are based I 
upon the statutory obligation of marital support, may be I 
modified by the court upon a proper showing, ordinarily I 
terminate with the death of either party, and may properly 
be held not to constitute a ,. debt" within the meaning of the 
('onstitutional provision. No such case for special exemption 
from the constitutional proscription ('an be made where the 
payments represent the result of a bargain negotiated by 
the parties in adjustment of their respective interests, and 
any implications to the contrary which may be found in the 
following cases are disapproved: In re Rasmussen (1922), 56 
Cal.App. 368 [205 P. 72] ; Ex Parte Weiler (1930), 106 Cal. 
App. 485 [289 P. 645] ; In re Lazar (1940), supra, 37 Cal. 
App.2d 327; Seymour v. Seymour (1937), 18 Cal.App.2d 
481 [64 P.2d 168] ; Tn'pp v. Superior Court (1923), supra, 
61 Ca1.App. 64; Shogren v. Superior Court (1949), 93 Cal. 
App.2d 356, 364 [209 P.2d 108]. 
[19] Inasmuch as it has been finally determined, as be-
tween these parties, that the payments to be made by peti-
tioner to Frances in the present case constitute "an insever-
able part of an integrated adjustment of all property rela-
tions of the partieS and not ... a severable provision for 
) 
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alimony" (Lane v. Bradley (1954), supra, 124 Cal.App.2d 
661, 666-667), we conclude that enforcement of such pay-
ments by contempt proceedings is forbidden by the constitu-
tional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. This con-
I'lusion makes unnecessary a discussion of other attacks made 
by petitioner upon the contempt order. 
For the reasons above stated, the order holding petitioner 
in contempt is annulled. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment annulling the con-
tempt order and I agree generally with the views expressed in 
the majority opinion, but since certain decisions of this court 
(Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36 [265 P.2d 873] ; Messenger v. 
Messenger,46 Cal.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988]) with which I do not 
agree are cited and relied upon in the majority opinion,' I 
feel constrained to withhold my unqualified concurrence 
therefrom. 
In the recent case of Herda v. Herda decided by this court 
on March 22, 1957, I took occasion in a concurring and dis-
senting opinion to call attention to the great confusion which 
now exists in this field of law due to irreconcilable conflicts 
in the decisions of this court and the appel1ate courts of this 
stat.e. Since the main issue in the case at bar involves the 
interpretation and application of article I, section 15. of the 
Constitution of California there is no need for further dis-
cussion relating to this conflict. 
TRA YNOR, J .-1 dissent. 
The majority opinion concedes that an alimony award 
based on the agreement of the parties is enforcible by con-
tempt (see also Holloway v. Holloway. 130 Ohio St. 214 [198 
N.E. 579, 154 A.L.R. 439] ; 154 A.L.R. 449) since it is suffi-
ciently related to the statutory duty of support incident to 
the marriage relationship as to be outside the constitutional 
prohibition of imprisonment for debt. (Cal. Const., art I. 
§ 15.) Rights and duties with respect to property growing 
out of tIle marriage relationship and crystallized in a court 
order are likewise outside the scope of that provision. Snch 
an order has not less a special charartrr breanse it is based 
Oil an agreement of .the parties than an alimony award based 
on sueh an agre('ment. Indeed, in some states the very theory 
) 
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underlying use of contempt to enforce awards of alimony 
is that alimony is itself an adjustment of property rights. 
(Lyon v. Lyon, 21 Conn. 185, 196-197; State v. Cook, 66 
Ohio St. 566 [64 N.E. 567, 568, 58 L.R.A. 625]; West v. 
West, 126 Va. 696 [101 S.E. 876, 877].) \ 
Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.App. 64 [214 P. 252], i 
Petry v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.App.2d 756 [116 P.2d 954], I 
and Seymour v. Seymour, 18 Cal.App.2d 481 [64 P.2d 168], 
upheld the use of contempt to enforce orders pursuant to 
property settlements even though they were not in lieu of 
the statutory duty of support. (See also Sullivan v. Superior 
Court, 72 Cal.App. 531, 535 [237 P. 782] ; Ex parte Weiler, 
106 Cal.App. 485, 488 [289 P. 645]; Shogren v. Superior 
Court, 93 Cal.App.2d 356, 364 [209 P.2d 108]; Young v. 
Superior Court, 105 Cal.App.2d 65, 67 [233 P.2d 39].) Al-
though the court stressed the duty of support as a basis for 
contempt in MiUer v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 733 [72 P.2d 
868], it cited with approval the Seymour and Tripp cases and 
expressly refused to follow the Maryland cases (Dickey v. 
Dickey, 154 Md. 675 [141 A. 387] j Bushman v. Bushman, 
157 Md. 166 [145 A. 488]), now invoked by the majority 
opinion. 
Even if the statutory duty of support were the sole justifi-
cation for enforcing such court orders by contempt, the ma-
jority opinion would still be in error in stating that an order 
to make payments pursuant to an integrated bargain cannot 
be so enforced, when the wife has not remarried. In Dexter 
v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 41-42 [265 P.2d 873], we stated: 
"When, as in this case ... , the parties have made the pro-
vision for support and maintenance an intel!ral part of their 
property settlement agreement, the monthly payments will 
ordinarily have a dual character. To the extent that they 
are designed to discharge the obligation of support and 
maintenance they will ordinarily reflect the charaeterist.ics of 
that. obligat.ion and thus have the indicia of alimony. [Cita-
tions.) On the other hand, to the extent that they represent 
a division of the community property itself, or constitute an 
inseparable part of the consideration for the property settle-
ment, they arc not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified 
without changing the terms of the property settlement agree-
ment of the parties." So long' as thE' wifr has not remarried, 
the characteristics of the support and maintE'llanre ob] igation 
remain and alone justif~r enforcrnwnt by contrmpt. Surh a 
rule is implicit in ,the Miller case, where the court took care 
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to point out that the payments were pursuant to a property 
settlement and eould not be changed without the consent of 
the parties. (9 Ca1.2d at 740 [see also, concurring and dis-
senting opinion of Carter, J. in Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 
36,45 [265 P.2d 873J : "The rule in such a case should be that 
if the entire agreement is approved by the court and part of its 
provisions are incorporated in the decree and order to be per-
formed, those portions included in the decree may be enforced 
by contempt proceedings."].) 
Even if the obligation to make the payments pursuant to 
the order of the court did constitute a debt within the mean-
ing of the constitutional provision, the obligor's wilful re-
fusal to make them when he is able to do so would be a "case 
of fraud" within the meaning of the exception in that pro-
"ision. In sustaining the validity of a criminal statute deal-
ing with nonpayment of wages this court stated: "The his- . : 
torical background of section 15 of article I and similar eon-
stitutional guaranties of other states clearly shows that the 
pro"isions were adopted to protect the poor but honest debtor 
who is unable to pay his debts, and were not intended to 
shield a dishonest man who takes an unconscionable advantage 
of another. [Citations.] It has long been recognized that 
wages are not ordinary debts, that they may be preferred over 
other claims, and that, because of the economic position of the 
average worker and, in particular, his dependence on wages 
for the necessities of life for himself and his family, it is 
('ssential to the public welfare that he receive his pay when 
it is due. [Citations.] An employer who knows that wages 
are due, has the ability to pay them, and still refuses to pay 
them, acts against good morals and fair dealing, and neces-
sarily intentionally does an act which prejudices the rights 
of his employee. Such conduct amounts to a 'case of fraud' 
within the meaning of the exception to the constitutional pro-
hibition and may be punished by statute." (In re Trombley, 
31 Cal.2d 801, 809-810 [193 P.2d 734]; see also Ex parte 
Grace, ]2 Iowa 208, 213 [79 Am.Dec. 529] ; Ex parte Olark, 
20 N.J.L. 648, 650-651 [45 Am.Dec. 394].) 
"\Vhether or not the reasoning of the Trombley case would 
apply to any wilful refusal to pay a debt when the obligor is 
able to pay, it clearly applies to obligations arising out of 
property settlement agreements irrespective of whether the 
Jlayments are solely alimony. "Property settlement ,agree-
ments occupy a fayored position in the law of this state and 
are sanctioned, by the Civil Code." (Adams v. Adams, 29 
) 
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Ca1.2d 621, 624 [177 P.2d 265], and cases cited.) There may 
be practical considerations for an order that community prop 
erty, such as a going business, remain intact and that the wife 
receive her share in periodic payments. Whether such pay-
ments are also intended to discharge a duty of support, they 
may actually be the wife's only means of support. As in 
the case of wages, the payments may be difficult to collect by 
repeated executions. The enforcement of the obligation by 
contempt is no more tantamount to imprisonment for debt 
than criminal punishment for the wilful refusal to pay wages. 
I would adhere to the settled law of this state and affirm 
the order holding petitioner in contempt. 
The petition of the real party in interest for a rehearing 
was denied June 5, 1957. Traynor, J.t was of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
